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Extremism and Social Learning 
 
Edward L. Glaeser* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 When members of deliberating groups speak with one another, their 
predeliberation tendencies often become exacerbated as their views become 
more extreme. The resulting phenomenon—group polarization—has been 
observed in many settings, and it bears on the actions of juries, administrative 
tribunals, corporate boards, and other institutions. Polarization can result from 
rational Bayesian updating by group members, but in many contexts, this 
rational interpretation of polarization seems implausible. We argue that people 
are better seen as Credulous Bayesians, who insufficiently adjust for 
idiosyncratic features of particular environments and put excessive weight on the 
statements of others where there are 1) common sources of information; 2) 
highly unrepresentative group membership; 3) statements that are made to 
obtain approval; and 4) statements that are designed to manipulate. Credulous 
Bayesianism can produce extremism and significant blunders. We discuss the 
implications of Credulous Bayesianism for law and politics, including media 
policy and cognitive diversity on administrative agencies and courts. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Many people have celebrated the potential value of deliberation, including its uses 
for democratic decisions (Habermas, 1998), and it is tempting to think that group 
decision-making will both produce wiser decisions and average out individual extremism. 
In many settings and countries, however, researchers have found that group deliberation 
leads people to take more extreme positions (Brown, 1986). The increased extremism, 
often called group polarization, is usually accompanied by greater confidence and 
significantly decreased internal diversity, even when individual opinions are given 
anonymously (Schkade et al., 2000; Brown, 1986, 207). These facts, which are 
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summarized in Section II of this paper, appear to cast doubt on the wisdom, and certainly 
the moderation, of crowds. If deliberation leads liberals to become more liberal, and 
conservatives to become more conservative, the effects of deliberation are unlikely to be 
desirable in both cases. 
 Group polarization has evident implications for many issues in law and politics. It 
suggests, for example, that like-minded jurors, judges, and administrative officials will 
move to extremes. If group members on a corporate board or in a political campaign are 
inclined to engage in risk-taking behavior, group deliberation will produce increased 
enthusiasm for taking risks. But the mechanisms behind group polarization remain 
inadequately understood, and it is difficult to make predictions or to offer prescriptions 
without identifying those mechanisms. 
 In Section III of this paper, we show that group polarization is predicted by a highly 
rational process of Bayesian inference. If individuals have independent information, 
which is shared in the deliberative process, then Bayesian learning predicts that ex post 
opinions will be both more homogenous within the group and more extreme than 
individual opinions. Bayesian inference suggests that individuals who have access only to 
their own private information will recognize their ignorance and hew towards the center. 
The information of the crowd provides new data, which should lead people to be more 
confident and more extreme in their views. Because group members are listening to one 
another, it is no puzzle that their post-deliberation opinions are more extreme than their 
pre-deliberation opinions. The phenomenon of group polarization, on its own, does not 
imply that crowds are anything but wise; if individual deliberators tend to believe that the 
earth is round rather than flat, nothing is amiss if deliberation leads them to be firmer and 
more confident in that belief.  
  While group polarization may reflect perfect Bayesian inference, there are other 
facts, summarized in Section IV, that cast doubt on this rosy rational interpretation. Often 
group deliberation produces greater confidence and greater extremism when little or 
nothing has been learned. Group polarization occurs even when little information is 
exchanged (Brown, 1986). People appear to attend to the stated opinions of others even 
when those opinions are patently wrong (Asch, 1995). Individuals often fail to give 
sufficient weight to the possibility that offered opinions are distorted by private 
3 
incentives to mislead (Camerer et al., 2004) or that people’s actions reflect private 
information (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). Outside the laboratory, professional persuaders, 
such as advertisers, political leaders, and clerics, have successfully led people to hold 
disparate religious beliefs that cannot all be true (Glaeser, 2004), and to think, falsely, 
that they prefer the taste of Coke to Pepsi (Shapiro, 2006) and that Mossad was 
responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001 (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004).  
 In Sections V-VIII of this paper, we suggest that social learning is often best 
characterized by what we call Credulous Bayesianism. Unlike perfect Bayesians, 
Credulous Bayesians treat offered opinions as unbiased and independent and fail to adjust 
for the information sources and incentives of the opinions that they hear. There are four 
problems here. First, Credulous Bayesians will not adequately correct for the common 
sources of their neighbors’ opinions, even though common sources ensure that those 
opinions add little new information. Second, Credulous Bayesians will not adequately 
correct for the fact that their correspondents may not be a random sample of the 
population as a whole, even though a non-random sample may have significant biases.1 
Third, Credulous Bayesians will not adequately correct for any tendency that individuals 
might have to skew their statements towards an expected social norm, even though peer 
pressure might be affecting public statements of view. Fourth, Credulous Bayesians will 
not fully compensate for the incentives that will cause some speakers to mislead, even 
though some speakers will offer biased statements in order to persuade people to engage 
in action that promotes the speakers’ interests. Our chief goal in Sections V–VIII is to 
show the nature and effects of these mistakes, which can make groups error-prone and 
anything but wise, especially if they lack sufficient diversity.  
  In Section V of the paper, we assume that errors in private signals are correlated 
across individuals. Credulous Bayesians overestimate the extent to which these signals 
are independent. The first proposition of the paper shows that when individuals are 
Credulous Bayesians, their post-deliberation beliefs become more erroneous and they 
acquire more misplaced confidence in those erroneous beliefs. This proposition helps 
explain why socially formed beliefs, like those about religion, politics, and constitutional 
                                                 
1 It is possible, of course, that a non-random sample will be unbiased; consider a non-random sample of 
neutral experts on the question whether, say, DDT imposes serious health risks. We use the term 
“representative sample” to mean relevantly representative, in the sense of lacking any kind of bias or skew. 
4 
law (and sometimes science as well), can be quite strongly held, despite a lack of 
evidence and an abundance of other groups holding opposing beliefs.  
 Our second proposition shows that when individuals are Credulous Bayesians, 
accuracy may decline as group size increases. As group size increases, mistakes can 
become more numerous and more serious. After all, the essence of Credulous 
Bayesianism is that people misuse the information of their neighbors, so more neighbors 
means more errors. This finding suggests that in some settings individuals may be wiser 
as well as less extreme than crowds (compare Surowiecki, 2005; Page, 2006).  
 We then turn to the possibility that an individual’s friends and social networks are 
not a random sample of the population. A group of people might have skewed views on 
questions of policy or fact, and group members may not sufficiently adjust for that fact. 
We formalize this possibility by assuming that noise terms in the sample are correlated, 
rather than independent, as they could be if the group has been selected on some attribute 
or taste. Credulous Bayesians underestimate the correlation of the signals and act as if 
their neighbors are a random sample of the population as a whole. In this case, Credulous 
Bayesianism again causes more extremism and more error. Here too, larger group sizes 
(so long as they do not produce representativeness) can make decision-making less 
accurate. For a wide range of parameter values, more correlation decreases accuracy. 
This is our first result favoring intellectual diversity.  
 We then model intellectual diversity more formally as mixing people whose 
information reflects different group-specific error terms. Intellectual diversity is much 
more valuable for Credulous Bayesians than it is for perfect Bayesians. When a group 
moves from being totally homogenous to being formed out of two equally sized 
populations with different sources of common information, then the variance of the post-
deliberation error falls more quickly for Credulous Bayesians than it does for perfect 
Bayesians. Intellectual diversity always has value (Page, 2006), but it becomes 
particularly important when decision-makers are Credulous Bayesians. 
 A large body of research has discussed the human tendency to give statements that 
conform to an expected community norm. For group deliberation, the problem is that 
people may discount this tendency and think, wrongly, that public statements actually 
convey information. In Section VI, we model conformism by assuming that individuals’ 
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statements reflect a combination of private information and an expectation of what 
individuals think that the group wants to hear. Credulous Bayesians fail fully to adjust for 
the fact that statements are skewed to the norm. The combination of conformism and 
Credulous Bayesianism creates error, tight homogeneity within groups, and greater 
heterogeneity across groups. If people utter politically correct statements, with the aim of 
avoiding the wrath of others, then Credulous Bayesianism could help explain both the 
blue state/red state phenomenon of ideological homogeneity within areas and 
heterogeneity across areas (Glaeser and Ward, 2006).  
 In Section VII, we assume that some individuals, like legal advocates or politicians, 
have incentives to report misleading information in their quest to change people’s 
decisions. “Polarization entrepreneurs,” in law and politics, might attempt to do exactly 
that. This claim is in a similar spirit to Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2007), 
who examine the interaction between persuasion and categorical thinking. In this case, 
Credulous Bayesians fail fully to correct for the motives of those around them. The 
combination of incentive-created misstatements and Credulous Bayesianism always leads 
to less accurate assessment and can lead to bias as well. The degree of bias depends on 
the imbalance of resources or incentives across persuaders, not the persuasion per se.  
 Section VIII of the paper briefly considers some policy implications of Credulous 
Bayesianism. Of course it is true that identification of potential group errors cannot lead 
to any particular set of institutional arrangements, which must be chosen after 
considering many variables. But in the legal setting, our results help to explain the 
longstanding practice of requiring a degree of political diversity on the independent 
regulatory commissions, such as the National Labor Relations Board, and also cast light 
on the current debate over intellectual diversity on the federal judiciary. For public and 
private institutions, unbiased decision-making may depend more on maintaining balance 
across decision-makers than on the elimination of misleading statements. We also offer 
some brief remarks on media policy, with particular reference to the now-abandoned 
fairness doctrine. Our question here involves the likely consequences if people are 
exposed to beliefs from sources with a defined set of ideological convictions. 
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II. Group Polarization: A Guided Tour 
 
 The original psychological experiments on the effects of deliberation involved risk-
taking behavior, with a demonstration that risk-inclined people become still more risk-
inclined after they deliberate with one another (Stoner, 1961). Risky decisions include 
taking a new job, investing in a foreign country, escaping from a prisoner-of-war camp, 
or running for political office (Hong, 1978). With respect to many such decisions, 
members of deliberating groups became significantly more risk-inclined after a brief 
period of collective discussion. On the basis of this evidence, it became standard to 
believe that deliberation produced a systematic “risky shift” (Brown, 1986). 
 Later studies drew this conclusion into serious question. On many of the same 
questions on which Americans displayed a risky shift, Taiwanese subjects showed a 
“cautious shift.” Deliberation led citizens of Taiwan to become significantly less risk-
inclined than they were before they started to talk (Hong, 1978). Among American 
subjects, deliberation sometimes produced a cautious shift as well, as risk-averse people 
became more averse to certain risks after they talked with one another (Moscovici and 
Zavalloni, 1969). The principal examples of cautious shifts involved the decision whether 
to marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain, 
possibly requiring medical attention. In these cases, the members of deliberating groups 
shifted not toward risk but toward greater caution (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). 
 A straightforward interpretation was able to reconcile these competing findings: the 
pre-deliberation median is the best predictor of the direction of the shift (Brown, 1986, 
210–12). When group members are disposed toward risk-taking, a risky shift is observed. 
Where members are disposed toward caution, a cautious shift is observed. Thus, for 
example, the striking difference between American and Taiwanese subjects is a product 
of a difference in the pre-deliberation medians of the different groups on the relevant 
questions (Hong, 1978). Thus the risky shift and the cautious shift are both subsumed 
under the rubric of group polarization. 
 In the behavioral laboratory, group polarization has been shown in a remarkably 
wide range of contexts (Turner et al., 1987, 142–70). Group deliberation produces more 
extreme judgments about the attractiveness of people shown in slides (Turner et al., 1987, 
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153). It also occurs for obscure factual questions, such as how far Sodom (on the Dead 
Sea) is below sea level (Turner et al., 1987). In a revealing finding at the intersection of 
cognitive and social psychology, groups have been found to make more, rather than 
fewer, conjunction errors (believing that A and B are more likely to be true than A alone) 
than individuals when individual error rates are high—though fewer when individual 
error rates are low (Kerr et al., 1996). Even burglars show a shift in the cautious direction 
when they discuss prospective criminal endeavors (Cromwell et al., 1991). 
 There is pervasive evidence of group polarization on issues that bear directly on 
politics and political behavior. With respect to affirmative action, civil unions for same-
sex couples, and climate change, liberals become significantly more liberal as a result of 
discussion, while conservatives become significantly more conservative (Schkade et al., 
2007). One experiment, conducted in Colorado, found that internal discussions among 
liberals in Boulder produce a strong shift to the left, resulting in both less internal 
diversity and more extremism; conservatives in Colorado Springs show a similar shift to 
the right (Schkade et al., 2007). In the same vein, white people who are not inclined to 
show racial prejudice show less prejudice after deliberation than before; but white people 
who are inclined to show such prejudice show more prejudice after deliberation (Myers 
and Bishop, 1970). After deliberation, French people become more distrustful of the 
United States and its intentions with respect to foreign aid (Brown, 1986, 224). Similarly, 
feminism becomes more attractive to women after internal discussions, at least if the 
relevant women are antecedently inclined to favor feminism (Myers, 1975).2   
 In the domain of law, there is considerable evidence of group polarization as well. 
Group polarization occurs for judgments of guilt and sentencing in criminal cases (Myers 
and Kaplan, 1976; Kaplan, 1977). In punitive damage cases, deliberating juries have been 
found to polarize, producing awards that are typically higher than those of the median 
juror before deliberation begins (Schkade et al., 2000). When individual jurors begin with 
a high degree of moral outrage about a defendant’s conduct, juries become more 
outraged, after deliberation, than their median member had been; but when jurors begin 
                                                 
22 There is a parallel literature that follows Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) that shows that initial views 
become more extreme after reading the same research. This finding -- that people with different beliefs 
disagree more after being exposed to the same information -- is harder to reconcile with standard Bayesian 
learning than the finding that group discussion increases polarization.  
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with little outrage about a defendant’s conduct, juries become less outraged, after 
deliberation, than their median juror had been. Dollar awards are often as high as or even 
higher than the highest award favored, before deliberation, by any individual juror 
(Schkade et al., 2000). 
 With respect to purely legal questions, panels of appellate judges polarize too. In 
ideologically contested areas (involving, for example, disability discrimination, sex 
discrimination, affirmative action, environmental protection, and campaign finance 
regulation), Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns when 
sitting on panels consisting entirely of Republican appointees, and Democratic appointees 
show especially liberal voting patterns when sitting solely with other Democratic 
appointees (Sunstein et al., 2006; Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 2004). This pattern has 
proved highly robust; it has been found in over twenty areas of substantive law. As a 
result, all-Republican panels show radically different voting patterns from those of all-
Democratic panels, in a way that seems to ensure that political judgments compromise 
ideals associated with the rule of law (Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 2004). In short, 
federal judges show the same polarization effects as do liberals and conservatives in 
Colorado.  
 
III. Group Polarization and Bayesian Inference 
 
 Why does group polarization occur? In this section, we show that the preceding facts 
about group polarization are not only compatible with Bayesian inference, but are 
primary predictions of the standard Bayesian model of social learning. We assume that 
individuals are trying to form an assessment of an unknown parameter, D, which might 
reflect the damages in a civil trial, the proper resolution of a constitutional dispute, the 
right response to climate change, or the dishonesty of a political candidate. For some 
readers, the exposition will be somewhat technical, but the intuition should not be 
obscure: If group members are listening to and learning from one another, their 
discussions will produce greater confidence. As confidence increases, convictions 
become firmer and individuals are more comfortable moving away from the center in the 
same direction as their predeliberation tendencies. 
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 Throughout this paper, we will make use of the normal signal extraction formula and 
therefore assume that all random variables are normally distributed. The true value of D 
has mean 0 (an arbitrary normalization) and variance 
0
1
P
.  Each individual receives a 
private signal, denoted iS  for individual i, which equals D plus a noise term, denoted iη , 
which is also mean zero and has variance 
1
1
P
. Bayes’ rule tells us that if an individual 
had nothing but this private signal, that individual’s estimate of D would equal 
10
1
PP
SP i
+ .  
 
 Our interest lies in social settings where “I” individuals communicate a share their 
private signals. In this first setting, we assume that people just relay their signals 
accurately to the group and that all of the signals are independent. The signal extraction 
formula then tells us that after communication all I individuals will share the same 
posterior assessment of D, which equals 
10
1
IPP
SP
i i
+
∑  or 
10
11
IPP
PDIP
i i
+
+ ∑η . This equals D plus 
an error term, 
10
01
IPP
DPP
i i
+
−∑η . This formula delivers two standard facts about the 
heterogeneity of posterior beliefs: 
 
Claim # 1: As the number of people that communicate independent signals increases, the 
posterior will become more accurate, in the sense that the variance of the error will fall, 
and the variance of posterior beliefs will rise. 
 
 The variance of error term equals 
10
1
IPP +  which is obviously declining with I. The 
variance of the posterior equals ( )100
1
IPPP
IP
+ , which is increasing with I. The ex post 
evaluation equals 
10
10
IPP
IPIP
+
+
 times the average evaluation ex ante, which is obviously 
greater than one. Group assessments are a simple multiple of average individual 
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assessments; it follows that just as in the experiments discussed above, we should expect 
to see groups head towards extremes in the direction suggested by individual opinions.  
 Moreover, it is quite easy to think of examples, especially when I is small, where the 
ex post opinion of the group is more extreme than even the most extreme antecedent 
opinion among the group’s members. Assume that there were three people with private 
signals of 0, 1, and 2 and assume that 40 =P  and 11 =P . Before the information 
exchange, the most extreme individual assessment of D was .4. After the information 
exchange, everyone believes that the expected value of D is .428. The group is not only 
more extreme than the average individual opinion but also more extreme than the most 
extreme individual opinion.  
 These findings rationalize the results of Schkade et al. (2006), and show that 
information exchange should lead to more extremism and less internal diversity, even 
when people are perfectly rational. Recall that when residents of Colorado Springs, a 
relatively conservative place, are brought together for group discussion, their opinions 
become more conservative on climate change policy, affirmative action, and civil unions 
for same-sex couples. When residents of Boulder, a relatively liberal place, come 
together, their opinions become more liberal on all three issues. This type of extremism 
from the exchange of information and opinions is exactly what a rational model with 
group learning would predict.  
 The standard explanations of group polarization show an intuitive appreciation of 
some of the more formal analysis here. One of the most prominent explanations refers to 
“informational influences” (Brown, 1986). This account is essentially Bayesian. The 
central idea is that group members will be aware of some, but not all, of the arguments 
that support the antecedent tendency within the group. As information is pooled, learning 
occurs, and the learning will predictably tend to intensify the antecedent tendency. It is 
evident that polarization often occurs as a result of such learning.  
 Other explanations of group polarization, invoking the effects of confidence and 
corroboration on people’s preexisting views, are also quite Bayesian. If rational people 
lack confidence, they will tend toward the middle and hence avoid the extremes. As 
people gain confidence after hearing their views corroborated by others, they usually 
become more extreme in their beliefs (Baron et al., 1996, 557–59). This is exactly what 
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the Bayesian model suggests. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s 
opinions have been shown to become more extreme simply because their views have 
been corroborated, and because they have become more confident after learning that 
others share their views (Baron et al., 1996). The Bayesian model predicts this process.  
 If group polarization merely reflects standard Bayesian inference, then it is hard to 
think that there is anything about polarization that challenges the conventional view that 
groups make better decisions than individuals. If people become firmer in their 
conviction that cigarettes cause cancer, that it is risky to drink and drive, or that the earth 
rotates around the sun, nothing is amiss. In the next section, we suggest that there are 
facts that are less compatible with rational Bayesian inference and more compatible with 
less perfect social learning. We will then suggest that a more realistic model of social 
learning presents a somewhat different and far less positive view about the accuracy of 
group decision-making.  
 
IV. Credulous Bayesians 
 
 The most obvious problem with the Bayesian framework is that group polarization is 
found even when people learn essentially nothing. To be sure, people must learn the bare 
fact that other people hold certain positions, and one can learn something from that fact, 
so long as others are not unreliable. But a significant shift in the domains of law and 
politics—toward, for example, enthusiasm for affirmative action policies or an 
international agreement to control greenhouse gases—should not be expected when 
people have discussions with others who lack independent information.  
 Return once more to the Colorado experiment. Both liberals and conservatives 
regularly polarized on questions involving climate change, affirmative action, and civil 
unions for same-sex couples, even though much of the time the discussion produced little 
or no new information. The same is true in the standard risky-shift experiments: People 
become more risk-inclined simply after learning that others are risk-inclined, without 
learning much, if anything, about why it makes sense to take risks. Indeed, group 
polarization occurs when people are merely exposed to the conclusions of others, rather 
than to the reasons for those conclusions (Brown, 1986).  
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 In many of the discussions in Colorado Springs and Boulder, the individuals who 
talked to each other were not bringing new data to the table. The residents of both of 
these places had been exposed to the same basic influences throughout most of their 
lives. For at least two of these issues (affirmative action and same-sex unions), there has 
been a huge amount of public discourse, and the discussions tended to add essentially 
nothing. For one of them (climate change), the issues are technical and complex, and few 
participants were actually able to provide new information. While some have argued that 
the enthusiasm of others provides new information in the discussion, such enthusiasm on 
these topics cannot really be new to anyone. So while the move to extremes is exactly 
what one might have predicted with a Bayesian model of social learning, the actual 
situation suggests a somewhat different scenario: people are treating each other’s 
opinions as offering new information even when there actually is nothing new.  
 Similar problems occur with models of group polarization that do not emphasize 
acquisition of information through discussion. According to the “social comparison” 
account, offered as an alternative to accounts that emphasize information, people want to 
maintain both their preferred self-conception and their preferred self-presentation 
(Brown, 1986). Suppose, for example, that group members believe that they are 
somewhat more likely to take investment risks than other people, or that they are 
somewhat more critical of the incumbent president than other people. If such people find 
themselves in a group of people who inclined to take investment risks, or to criticize the 
incumbent president, they might shift, not because they have learned anything, but 
because they want to see themselves, and present themselves, in the preferred way. The 
social comparison account makes a place for conformism, taken up in detail below. What 
that account misses is that in many settings, people shift in the belief that others are 
saying what they think or know, even though they are actually motivated by social 
motivations. Sometimes people do move because they desire to conform, but sometimes 
they move because they believe, falsely, that the views of others provide valuable 
information. 
 In the remainder of the paper, we explore an alternative explanation of group 
polarization: the hypothesis that individuals are Credulous Bayesians, who treat proffered 
opinions as having significant information value, even when those opinions are biased or 
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based on no new information. Of course most heuristics work reasonably well (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1971; Gigerenzer, 2007), and there is nothing inherently unreasonable 
about Credulous Bayesianism, which is essentially a Bayesian heuristic. Most of the 
opinions that we hear over the course of a day are given to us by well-meaning people 
who are in fact sharing new information, on topics like the quality of a restaurant or 
whether or not it is raining. It is quite sensible to take those opinions seriously. It is even 
more sensible for children to be attuned to take the advice given to them by their parents, 
on, say, not playing with knives or not eating poisonous objects. In fact, the human 
ability to learn from one another is a cornerstone of our species and its civilizations.  
 With this background, we can see that Credulous Bayesianism is essentially a failure 
to fine-tune learning for each individual setting, and a failure to correct for the motives of 
others. We may, on average, assign the right amount of weight to the opinions of friends 
or strangers, but in some settings we should be more skeptical, but do not bother to think 
through the appropriate degree of skepticism. A sensible model of costly cognition could 
easily explain such a tendency, especially in settings where getting it right has little 
private value. It may well be that the tendency to be suspicious imposes costs beyond 
mere thinking, because suspicion may also be linked to uncomfortable emotions and an 
inability to enjoy a pleasant conversation. We suspect that going through life being 
intensely suspicious of every new statement would impose enormous cognitive and 
emotional costs. Credulous Bayesians are able to avoid such costs.   
 Credulous Bayesianism is linked to the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. 
(2004). Camerer et al. show that behavior in many games can be rationalized with a 
model in which only a subset of the population is able to think about the motives and 
implied actions of those around them. Credulous Bayesianism is quite similar in that 
when people use it, they are essentially failing to think through why opinions that they 
hear may not be unbiased or informative. There is also a link between Credulous 
Bayesianism and the Cursed Equilibrium concept of Eyster and Rabin (2005). In a 
Cursed Equilibrium, individuals make a naïve inference based on people’s actions; 
Credulous Bayesians make a naïve inference based on people’s statements.  
 We believe that Credulous Bayesianism makes more sense of the Colorado 
experiment than perfect Bayesian inference. Little new information was proffered in this 
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setting, so it is hard to see how Bayesian learning occurred, but opinions were given. If 
Credulous Bayesianism makes us prone to put weight on the opinions of others (even 
when they are based on the same sources as our own views), then we would expect to see 
something that looks like learning, in that opinions become more extreme and more 
tightly held, even though little or no real information is being exchanged.  
 In fact, an abundance of psychological evidence suggests that people do use a 
“follow the majority” heuristic that puts great weight on the opinions of others 
(Gigerenzer, 2007). Psychologists have often shown that people follow the views of 
others even when those others are palpably wrong. In the most famous experiments, 
Solomon Asch explored whether people would be willing to overlook the apparently 
unambiguous evidence of their own senses (Asch, 1995). In these experiments, the 
subject was placed into a group of seven to nine people who seemed to be other subjects 
in the experiment but who were actually Asch’s confederates. The simple task was to 
“match” a particular line, shown on a large white card, to the one of three “comparison 
lines” that was identical to it in length. Asch’s striking finding was that when confronted 
with the obviously wrong but unanimously held views of others, most people end up 
yielding to the group at least once in a series of trials. Indeed, in a series of twelve 
questions, no less than 70 percemt of people went along with the group, and defied the 
evidence of their own senses, at least once (Asch, 1995, 16).  
 It might seem jarring to think that people would yield to a unanimous group when 
the question involves a moral, political, or legal issue on which they have great 
confidence. But additional experiments, growing out of Asch’s basic method, find huge 
conformity effects for many judgments about morality, politics, and law (see Crutchfield, 
1955). Such effects were demonstrated for issues involving civil liberties, ethics, and 
crime and punishment. Consider the following statement: “Free speech being a privilege 
rather than a right, it is proper for a society to suspend free speech when it feels 
threatened.” Asked this question individually, only 19 percent of the control group 
agreed. But confronted with the shared opinion of four others, 58 percent of people 
agreed (Kretch et al., 1962, 509). 
 Nonexperimental evidence also supports the view that people put weight on opinions 
that they hear, even when those opinions are biased by incentives or based on very 
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limited information. Billions of dollars are spent on advertising, in which obviously 
biased statements are made about a product’s qualities. If these statements were not 
effective, it would be hard to believe that firms would spend so much on them. There is 
also more direct evidence on the impact of advertising. People generally say that they 
think they prefer the taste of Coke to Pepsi, and their buying habits suggest that they 
believe that to be true, yet in blind taste tests people generally do prefer the taste of Pepsi 
to Coke (Shapiro, 2006).  
 Other settings also seem to suggest that people are Credulous Bayesians. There is a 
paucity of hard information about many religious topics, including the afterlife, the nature 
of any deities that may exist, and the lives or even the existence of many historical 
religious figures. Yet individuals believe in their religious beliefs fervently and are often 
willing to die or kill for them. These religious beliefs seem to be formed by statements of 
parents or religious leaders, and both of these groups often have little direct knowledge of 
core religious beliefs, but strong incentives to shape those beliefs in a particular direction. 
A more perfect Bayesian would presumably treat these opinions with a great deal of 
skepticism, especially when that Bayesian learns that millions of others hold very 
different beliefs, yet the strong beliefs about religion that are transferred from person to 
person look to us more like Credulous Bayesianism.  
 In political settings, there is also evidence that people accept statements that they 
hear with relatively little critical appraisal. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004), for example, 
document the remarkable range of beliefs held in the Islamic world about Israel and the 
United States. Most striking among those is the view that Mossad was responsible for the 
9/11 terrorist attacks on America. Within the U.S. as well, there is abundant evidence that 
many people have acquired incorrect beliefs, such as a vastly overinflated view of the 
amount that the U.S. government spends on foreign aid or the connection between 
Saddam Hussein and the 9/11 attacks. Again, the heterogeneity in these views seems 
incompatible with any kind of perfect Bayesianism, but it is much easier to reconcile with 
individuals who are Credulous Bayesians.  
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V. Credulous Bayesians, Common Noise, and Biased Samples 
 
 We now turn to our theoretical exploration of Credulous Bayesianism. To reflect the 
core rationality of social learning, we begin with the Bayesian learning model described 
in Section III, where individuals are trying to infer the truth based on a combination of 
their private information and the information sent by others. The critical deviation from 
standard Bayesian learning models is that we assume that people do not accurately assess 
the degree to which social signals actually represent new information. We are essentially 
following DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) by assuming that individuals have 
trouble correcting the degree to which they should down-weight social signals in any 
given setting.  
 In this first model, we follow DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) closely and 
consider the case where individual opinions share a strong common component, but the 
degree of common noise is underestimated by the participants in the model. As in Section 
III, we think of a group of I individuals sharing information and forming a posterior 
assessment of the value of D. This setting could capture the deliberations of a judicial 
panel or any group of people that exchanges ideas and then makes a decision.  
 As in Section III, we assume that individuals receive a private signal equal to D plus 
a noise term denoted iη . However, unlike in Section III, we now assume that the noise 
term iη  is the sum of a common noise term θ and an individual specific term iε . The 
total variance of the noise term remains 
1
1
P
. The variance of θ  is 
1P
ν  and the variance of 
iε  is 
1
1
P
ν− . This change does not alter the Bayesian formula for pre-deliberation 
opinions, which remains 
10
1
PP
SP i
+ .  
 If individuals shared their signals and used the correct Bayesian updating formula, 
their posterior view would equal 
10
1
))1(1( IPIP
SP
i i
+−+
∑
ν . This formula puts less weight on 
the signals of others as the share of the noise that is common increases. Since the share of 
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common noise makes each new signal less informative, people appropriately put less 
weight on each new signal when much noise is common.  
 Throughout the remainder of this paper, we assume one common core deviation 
from perfect Bayesianism: individuals underestimate the degree to which information that 
they hear from others is biased or based on common sources. In this context, we model 
this underestimation by assuming the people underestimate the extent to which the noise 
terms are common. Specifically, every one of the agents in the model believes that the 
variance of θ  is 
1P
λν  and the variance of iε  is 
1
1
P
λν− . The parameter λ  measures the 
extent to which individuals are Credulous Bayesians and underestimate the amount of 
common noise. The parameter ranges from one, which would mean perfect rationality, to 
zero, which would mean a complete failure to assume any common error terms. We also 
assume that individuals update as if they knew this parameter perfectly, so that the new 
formula for posterior beliefs is 
10
1
))1(1( IPIP
SP
i i
+−+
∑
λν  or 
( )
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 We are interested in the impact of Credulous Bayesianism on three different variance 
terms associated with ex post beliefs. First, we are interested in the actual variance of ex 
post beliefs, which equals 
( )
( )2100
101
))1(1(
))1(1(
IPIPP
IPIPIP
+−+
+−+
λν
ν
. Higher levels of variance of 
posterior beliefs mean more polarization of beliefs. Second, we are interested in the 
variance of the true error associated with those beliefs or 
( ) 10210
1
))1(1(
)1(1
))1(1(
)1)(1(
IPIP
I
IPIP
IPI
+−+
−+++−+
−−
λν
λν
λν
νλ . The variance of this error term 
captures the extent to which people are incorrect in the posterior assessments. Finally, we 
are interested in the variance of the error term that people believe to be associated with 
their posterior beliefs, or 
10 ))1(1(
)1(1
IPIP
I
+−+
−+
λν
λν
. This error term reflects the degree of 
certainty that people have ex post.  
 The following proposition gives the impact of Credulous Bayesianism on variance in 
posterior beliefs, on the variance of the error associated with those beliefs, and on the 
perceived variance of the error associated with those beliefs:  
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Proposition 1: As the value of λ  falls, the variance of ex post beliefs increases, the 
variance of the error in those beliefs also rises, and the degree to which people 
underestimate their true level of error rises as well. As the share of the noise term that is 
common increases, the difference between the actual precision of the posterior and the 
perceived precision of the posterior will rise as long as 010 )1( PIIPP λν−>+ .  
 Proposition 1 shows that Credulous Bayesianism causes the heterogeneity of 
posterior beliefs to rise, which means that group polarization will be more pronounced 
among Credulous Bayesians. Belief in the independence of information makes it more 
likely that groups will converge on a more extreme belief, essentially because they 
believe that they have better information than they do. In fact, the evidence is consistent 
with this finding (Brown, 1986; Schkade et al., 2000).
 
 While the extremism associated with standard Bayesian learning accompanies an 
increase in accuracy, Credulous Bayesianism increases extremism while decreasing 
accuracy. The fact, stated in Proposition 1, that Credulous Bayesianism causes the 
variance of the error term to increase means that on average posterior beliefs will be less 
accurate. This is not surprising; excessive credulity is, after all, going to produce errors. It 
is perhaps somewhat more surprising that the perceived variance of the posterior error 
falls with Credulous Bayesianism. This means that Credulous Bayesianism can explain 
the phenomenon of people holding onto erroneous opinions with a great deal of intensity.  
 The final sentence in the proposition shows that the degree of erroneous confidence 
may rise as the noise terms become more highly correlated across people. This effect is 
not automatic because increasing the amount of common noise creates two opposing 
effects. First, the increase in common noise does cause individuals to put less weight on 
social signals. Second, as the amount of common noise rises, the tendency to think that 
each person has independent information becomes costlier. If λ is sufficiently low, so that 
the bias is sufficiently severe, then the second effect must dominate, and more common 
noise means more false confidence. This fact suggests that Credulous Bayesians will 
make particularly bad decisions when there is common noise.  
 
 Proposition 1 tells us that decision-making gets worse as people mistakenly fail to 
correct for the common sources of information, but it does not show that group decision-
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making can actually be worse than individuals acting alone. Proposition 2 gives 
conditions when the amount of error, as measured by the variance of the error of the 
posterior, can rise with group size: 
Proposition 2: The variance of the error of the posterior estimate will always decline with 
I if λ  is sufficiently close to one. If ( )110
00
12 vPPvP
PPI −−
+> ν  and and λ is sufficiently close 
to zero, then the variance of the error of posterior beliefs will rise with I. 
 If people are sufficiently prone to Credulous Bayesianism, i.e., ifλ is sufficiently 
close to zero, and if common noise is sufficiently important, then group size decreases 
accuracy. These conditions do not imply that the folly of groups is a general condition. In 
many cases these conditions will fail, and groups will be wiser than individuals, but the 
possibility that the conditions of Proposition 2 will sometimes be met should warn us that 
groups will sometimes make worse decisions than individuals. And in fact, a great deal of 
evidence suggests that groups often perform worse than their best member or even their 
median member (Gigone and Hastie, 1995). 
 
Biased Samples 
 
 A similar effect can occur if instead of common noise, we assume that individuals 
have correlated error terms. In fact, common noise itself is a special case of correlated 
errors. The correlation of error terms within a group would occur if the group were not a 
random sample of the world, but rather a specific subset with highly similar backgrounds 
or biases. If people sorted into communities or conversed with people who had similar 
views, then we should certainly expect to see correlation in the error terms of people who 
regularly communicate with one another. The intuition here is straightforward: People 
who find themselves in a certain group often do not give sufficient thought to the 
possibility that the group is unrepresentative in a way that ought to matter for purposes of 
social learning. People in left-leaning or right-leaning groups listen to fellow group 
members, without discounting what they learn in light of the dispositions of those 
members. 
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 Perfect Bayesians should strongly discount the opinions of their highly selected 
acquaintances. People would know that there is a skew in the information held within 
group members (Democrats, Republicans, union members, Americans, and so forth). 
Credulous Bayesians, however, imperfectly correct for the unrepresentative nature of 
their friends opinions. They assume that their friends are representative of the world, not 
a very unusual set of informants.  
 To address this possibility, we assume that individuals continue to receive a private 
signal equal to D plus a noise term denoted iη . The variances of these two terms are the 
same as before, but now we assume that the covariance of any two noise terms in a 
person’s group is 
1P
ψ
. With this assumption and assuming that people know this 
covariance term, the correct Bayesian inference formula is 
10
1
))1(1( IPIP
SP
i i
+−+
∑
ψ . As the 
degree of correlation rises, individuals should put less weight on the opinions of their 
neighbors.  
 In this instance, Credulous Bayesians underestimate the degree to which their 
neighbors’ error terms are correlated with their own, which is equivalent to assuming that 
one’s neighbors are more representative of the overall population than they actually are. 
To capture this, we assume that people believe that the true covariance of neighbor’s 
signals is 
1P
λψ
. Credulous Bayesians use an updating formula of 
10
1
))1(1( IPIP
SP
i i
+−+
∑
λψ  , 
which puts too much weight on the signals received by a biased sample of neighbors.  
 The impact of Credulous Bayesianism when there are correlated noise terms is 
almost identical to the impact of Credulous Bayesianism when there is a common noise 
term.  
Proposition 3: (a) As the value of λ  falls, the variance of ex post beliefs increases and 
the variance of the error in those beliefs also rises.  
 (b) The variance of the posteriors will always rise with I. 
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 (c) The variance of the error of the posterior estimate will decline with I as long as 
λ  is close enough to one. If 
10
0
)1(2
)1(
PP
PI ψψ
ψ
−−
+> , then the variance of the error of the 
posterior estimate will rise with I as long as λ  is close enough to zero. 
 Just as before, individuals who fail to understand the degree to which their group is 
not representative will tend to have more extreme and more erroneous posterior beliefs. 
Credulous Bayesians have too much faith in the views of their neighbors and to 
underestimate the extent to which their neighbors make mistakes that are similar to their 
own.  
 The third part of the proposition shows that when individuals are close to being 
perfect Bayesians, then a larger group will always lead to views that are more accurate, as 
well as more extreme. However, if individuals are close to being completely naïve 
Bayesians, who don’t think that there is any correlation in their signals, then as long as 
0
1
)1(
1
1
12
P
P
II
>−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − ψψ
ψ  accuracy will decline with group size. These are sufficient 
conditions for crowds to be more foolish than individuals. The intuition behind the 
condition is that this somewhat perverse result is more likely when signals are highly 
correlated, when group size is already large, and when the signal to noise ratio in 
individual signals is quite low.  
 The next proposition provides our first result on the benefits of diversity, which in 
this case means a reduction in the degree of correlation across signals. 
Proposition 4: (a) As the degree of correlation in the signal noise (ψ ) rises, the variance 
of the posterior belief will decline if and only if 
01
01
))1(2(2 PIIP
PIP
−++
+> ψλ  
 (b) The variance of the error in the posterior belief will rise with ψ if and only if 
)21(
)1( 0
01 λλψ −>−
+
PI
PIP
.   
 The first part of this proposition shows that increasing correlation of signals can 
either increase or decrease ex post extremism. Part (a) implies that when λ  is greater 
than one half, then increasing correlation of signals will cause posterior beliefs to become 
less extreme. There is nothing surprising in this fact. Lower correlation of noise means 
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that there is more information in the signals and more information should cause beliefs to 
become more extreme.  
 The opposite result occurs when λ  is sufficiently less than one half. In that case, 
more correlation actually leads to more ex post extremism. High correlation of noise 
means that the average signal will get more extreme, and since people are putting too 
much weight on that average signal, their views get more extreme as well.  
 The second part of the proposition gives a condition under which a reduction in 
correlation in the noise, which can be seen as more diversity, increases the accuracy of ex 
post beliefs. If λ  is greater than one half or sufficiently low, then this natural result 
always holds. More diversity improves accuracy. The opposite result can occur when 
people reason particularly poorly, but we suspect that this is more of a theoretical 
curiosity than a case to worry about.  
 
Intellectual Diversity 
 
 We now continue with our investigation of intellectual diversity and return to the 
framework with common noise terms. This simple framework is meant to help evaluate 
the benefit of intellectual diversity in groups, such as panels of judges, legislatures, or 
students in a classroom. Our specific interest is to ask whether diversity is more or less 
valuable as people become more rational.  
 We model diversity by assuming that different groups have independent draws of the 
common noise term θ . While such diversity always improves information quality, the 
value of diversity can be significantly higher when people are Credulous Bayesians.  We 
assume that a fraction α  of the I people who are sharing information come from a group 
that has one draw of θ  while the rest of the group has received a second independent 
common signal. The true Bayesian posterior is then:  
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Credulous Bayesians recognize that people from the two groups have different common 
noise terms, but they continue to underestimate the true amount of common error by a 
factor λ  and this produces the modified formula: 
 
(1’)
 
( )
( ) ( ) 1202222
1
)1(2)1()1()1()1(
)1())1(1(
PvIIPIvI
SISIP
Ii iIi i
λααλνλααλνλνλν
αλνλναλνλν αα
−+−+−+−+−
+−+−+− ∑∑ >< . 
 
 This formula nests both the perfect Bayesian and a learner who completely ignores 
the common error components in people’s signals. This ultra-naïve Bayesian would use 
the formula for learning with independent signals, 
10
1
IPP
SP
i i
+
∑ . As long as 0>λ , then 
Credulous Bayesians, like perfect Bayesians, put more weight on the views of the 
members of the minority group since that group provides more information as its 
members had a different common shock. In Section IX, we will turn to a case where 
individuals put less weight on the opinions of outsiders.  
 The next proposition discusses the impact of increasing intellectual diversity by 
changing the population shares of the two groups: 
Proposition 5:  
(a) The variance of prediction error is declining with α if and only if α <.5 for both 
perfect Bayesians and naïve Bayesians. More generally, the variance of 
prediction error is declining with α when α is small enough and the other 
parameters satisfy 
+++−+−+−> )))2(24(2(0 1 vIvvIP λλλλ  
))))1)(2(2))2(8()1()2(2)1(3(2(2( 220 λλλλ vIIvIIvIvvIvP −−+−++−−−+++−++−  
(b) An increase in α from 0 to .5 will cause a decline in the variance of the error of 
posterior beliefs for naïve Bayesians that is larger than the decline in the variance 
of the error for perfect Bayesians. 
 Part (a) of the Proposition tells us that when α  is small, an increase in the amount of 
diversity increases the accuracy of posterior beliefs when people are either perfect 
Bayesians or naïve Bayesians. A greater mix of people makes it easier to factor out the 
24 
common noise for either of these two extreme groups. The condition given in the 
proposition is sufficient to ensure that diversity will be good in more intermediate cases, 
and it seems likely to hold for most reasonable parameter values.  
 The second part of the proposition tells us that the advantages associated with 
mixing will be larger when people are Credulous Bayesians than when people are perfect 
Bayesians. When there is a lot of common noise, the naïve Bayesians suffer both because 
of that noise and because they misattribute that noise to underlying truth. As there is more 
mixing, the common noise gets averaged out, and there is both more accuracy and less 
misattribution among the naïve Bayesians. This result suggests that intellectual diversity 
is particularly valuable when people incorrectly underestimate the common source of 
signals. 
.  
VI. Credulous Bayesians and Conformism 
 
 At this point, we drop the assumption that individuals perfectly report their own 
signals and instead assume that individuals exhibit a tendency towards conformism when 
reporting their results. We also assume that all errors are idiosyncratic. This tendency 
towards conformism might come about for signaling reasons, as in Morris (2001), or out 
of a taste for conformity, as in Bernheim (1994). We assume that people care both about 
reporting the truth and about saying something that conforms to the norm in their group. 
The problem arises when people do not sufficiently discount people’s statements, treating 
those statements as informative when in fact they reflect only the pressure to conform. In 
a political organization, for example, group members may disregard the possibility that 
disparagement of some environmental concern is driven not by knowledge, but by a 
perception that disparagement of environmental concerns is popular within the relevant 
group. Conformity pressures are responsible for “pluralistic ignorance,” understood to 
mean ignorance of the judgments and beliefs of other people. The group norm distorts 
what people say they believe. 
 The norm is known and denoted η . Specifically, we assume that people report a 
signal meant to minimize the quadratic loss functions: ( ) ( )22 ~)1(~ ηγγ −−+− iii SSS that 
sums losses from lying and losses from deviating from the community norm. Optimizing 
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behavior then generates the reporting rule: ηγγ )1(~ −+= ii SS , which means that reported 
signals are an average of the truth and the community norm. If people correctly transform 
reported signals, by subtracting ηγ )1( −  and multiplying by γ/1 , then use of the 
standard Bayesian inference formula 
10
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)1)(1(~1
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ij ji
+
⎟⎟⎠
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will yield the 
most accurate posterior.  
 However, Credulous Bayesianism may operate in this setting as well, and in this case 
we assume that it causes people to underestimate the extent to which others have skewed 
their opinions to conform to the community norm. Instead, Credulous Bayesians assume 
that other people are using a reporting rule of ηλγλγ )1(~ −+= ii SS  , where ]/1,1[ γλ ∈ , 
which nests the two extremes of perfectly correcting for conformity and treating everyone 
else as being a completely honest reporter of their private signal. This changes the 
formula for the posterior belief to 
10
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+
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. In this case, 
there is no longer homogeneity within a group, because individuals see their own signals 
accurately but incorrectly treat the signals of those around them. One interpretation of 
this assumption is that people suffer from a lack of higher order reasoning by failing to 
consider the motives of those around them. With this formula, Proposition 6 follows: 
Proposition 6: If 0>η  and 1>λ  then posterior beliefs will be biased upwards, and this 
bias increases with λ , η , I and 1P  and falls with 0P .  
 If η  is randomly distributed across groups, with mean zero and variance )(ηVar , 
then the variance of posterior beliefs is rising with λ  if and only if 
10
11)()1)(1(
PP
IVarI +−+>−− ληλ  . The within-group (i.e. conditioning on D and η ) 
variance in posterior beliefs is always declining with λ . The variance of the error in 
posterior beliefs is always rising with λ .
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 Proposition 6 shows how conformism in stating beliefs will affect Credulous 
Bayesians. A norm of stating a belief of η  will cause biased posteriors if and only if 
1>λ  , so that people don’t sufficiently correct for the fact that statements are 
conforming to a norm. The degree of that bias increases with the extent that people don’t 
adequately control for conformism in people’s statements (λ ) and the magnitude of the 
norm (η ).  
 Larger groups will have more bias because individuals base their beliefs more on the 
opinions of others and less on their own private signal. Credulous Bayesianism doesn’t 
cause any error in an individual’s private signal, but it does cause people incorrectly to 
assess the impact of their neighbor’s views. As group sizes increase, there is a larger 
range of outside voices for people to misinterpret.  
 The amount of bias is also increasing with the variance of the true value (D) and 
declining with the variance of the noise terms. The connection between the bias and these 
two variance terms occurs because people weight the signals that they hear more highly 
when the variance in the underlying parameter is higher and the variance in the noise 
term is lower. As people weight the messages that they hear more heavily, the impact of 
Credulous Bayesianism naturally increases, because they are generally weighting these 
signals incorrectly. 
 Proposition 6 also tells us that the variance of the error in posterior beliefs is always 
rising with λ . When people get worse at correcting for conformism, their beliefs become 
less accurate. Credulous Bayesianism causes an increase in the uniformity of beliefs 
within a group, as people conform in their statements to the group-wide norm, and those 
statements then influence the heterogeneity of beliefs within that group. (Recall the 
finding to this effect in the Colorado experiment.) 
 If the variance of norms across groups is sufficiently high, the combination of 
Credulous Bayesianism and conformism can actually increase the heterogeneity of 
posterior beliefs within the population. When the variance of norms is low, then 
Credulous Bayesians weight other people’s opinions less, since people perceive less of a 
need to inflate the perceived difference between the actual statement and the norm. When 
the variance of norms is high, then Credulous Bayesianism makes these norms extremely 
powerful, since people believe that they receive information from their peers, while they 
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are really just hearing statements that reflect the prevailing norm. When the variance of 
norms is high, then Credulous Bayesianism acts mainly to cause people to inflate the 
importance of these norms. In this case, we should expect to see increased conformity 
and within groups of Credulous Bayesians and increased heterogeneity across groups and 
across the population as a whole—what has been called “second-order diversity” 
(Gerken, 2004).  
 The parameter γ  does not appear in Proposition 6 because it is not conformism that 
matters but rather the extent to which people don’t correct for that conformism, which is 
captured in the λ  term. The degree of conformism does matter, however, if we assume 
that individuals completely fail to correct for the tendency to conform, and set γλ /1= . 
In that case γ  matters because it affects λ  and Corollary 1 follows: 
Corollary 1: If people are naïve Bayesians who completely fail to correct for the 
tendency of statements to conform to the norm, then as γ  falls and conformism rises, the 
positive bias of the posterior increases if 0>η , the variance of the error in posterior 
beliefs rises and the variance of beliefs within groups declines. The variance of posterior 
beliefs falls with γ  if and only if 
10
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 If people are completely naïve Bayesians, then increased conformism increases the 
degree of error and bias in beliefs. As before, heterogeneity within groups will decline 
with the amount of conformism. Heterogeneity across people and groups can rise if the 
variation in the norm across society as a whole is sufficiently high.  
These results can also help us understand experimental results showing that if 
members of the group think that they have a shared identity, and a high degree of 
solidarity, there will be heightened polarization (Abrams et al., 1990, 112). And if 
members of the deliberating group are connected by ties of affection and solidarity, 
polarization will increase. A sense of “group belongingness” predictably affects the 
extent of polarization.3  
A revealing experiment, fitting closely with the account we are offering here, 
attempted to investigate the effects of group identification on polarization (Spears, Lee, 
                                                 
3 In the same vein, physical spacing tends to reduce polarization; a sense of common fate and intragroup 
similarity tend to increase it, as does the introduction of a rival “outgroup.” 
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and Lee, 1990). Some subjects were given instructions in which group membership was 
made salient (the “group immersion” condition), whereas others were not (the 
“individual” condition). For example, subjects in the group immersion condition were 
told that their group consisted solely of first-year psychology students and that they were 
being tested as group members rather than as individuals. The relevant issues involved 
affirmative action, government subsidies for the theatre, privatization of nationalized 
industries, and phasing out nuclear power plants. Polarization generally occurred, but it 
was greater when group identity was emphasized. This experiment shows that 
polarization is highly likely to occur, and to be most extreme, when group membership is 
made salient.  
 In the context of the model, increases in λ  and γ (parameters which capture the 
degree to which people make conformist statements and accept conformist statements as 
truth), can be interpreted as increases in the strength of group membership. Increasing the 
sense of solidarity presumably makes people more likely to trust one another, i.e. to have 
a high value of λ , and possibly less likely to lie to each other, which would cause γ to 
rise. Higher values of both of these parameters will always increase the conformity within 
the group. As long as the variance of norms across groups is sufficiently high, increases 
in these parameters will also cause the polarization of the groups to increase. This can 
explain the connection between group identity and group polarization.  
 
VII. Persuasion 
 
 In this section, we explore the impact of self-interested persuaders on Credulous 
Bayesians. This model follows along the lines of Mullainathan, Schwartzstein and 
Shleifer (2007), who look at persuasion and coarse, categorical thinking. We now assume 
that statements are motivated not by a simple desire for conformism, but by a desire to 
influence an outcome, like sentence length, environmental policy, guilt or innocence, or 
purchasing patterns. We assume that one or more decision-makers will choose an 
outcome that is equal to their posterior assessment of D. In this case, we assume that the 
decision-makers have no independent knowledge of the true value of D, other than its 
mean of zero and variance of 0/1 P . All information beyond that comes from the 
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statements of I other individuals who do have private signals with idiosyncratic error 
terms of variance 1/1 P  . To keep things simple, we return to the assumption of Section III 
that the private signals have independent error terms.  
 As before, these other individuals have a taste for telling the truth, but they also go in 
a particular direction. We capture these assumptions by assuming that these people 
maximize the expectation of ( )2~ö ii SSD −− γπ
 
where π  differs across the population and 
reflects the heterogeneous objectives of different actors and Dö
 
denotes the chosen 
outcome. One interpretation of this model is that signals are being produced by two 
lawyers, one of which has a value of π  of one and the other of which has a value of π  of 
minus one. The two lawyers are both trying to persuade the judge and jury of the truth of 
their view of the case. They are constrained somewhat by the truth, but send signals that 
are biased towards their side of the case.  
 We constrain the decision-maker to use a linear updating rule so that posterior 
beliefs equal ∑∑ − i ii i KS~β , where β  are endogeneously determined weights that will 
be discussed later and jK  is a constant that may be person specific but that is 
independent of the reported signal. Given this assumption, the individual’s choice of 
reported signal will satisfy: γβπ /5.~ += ii SS  In this case, the existence of incentives 
creates an additive error term which surrounds the signal. 
 We assume that the decision-maker does not know the values of γπ /5. , but has an 
opinion about the distribution of this variable, which we denote iμ . The variable is 
normally distributed with variance of μP/1 . If the true mean of this variable is zero, 
optimal signal extraction means that the decision make will set his estimate of the 
average value of jK  equal to zero if the individual cannot distinguish the motives of the 
speakers If we assume that the decision-maker cannot commit to the weights that will be 
used ex post to form the posterior and the judgment, then the weights that minimize the 
variance of the error in the decision-maker’s posterior belief will satisfy the equation
 
μ
βββ
PPP
I
P
3
100
21 ++= , and we denote that value *β .  
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 In this case, Credulous Bayesianism will cause the decision-maker to underestimate 
the true heterogeneity of bias in the population by thinking that the variance of γπ /5.  is 
μλ P/ . This assumption can be thought of as a naïve trust in people’s honesty or, again, 
as a failure to engage in higher order reasoning which would lead to the view that people 
slant their statements to achieve an end. In this case, the optimal ex post value of )(* λβ  
satisfies
μ
λβββ
PPP
I
P
3
100
21 ++= . Differentiating this condition implies that a higher value 
of λ  causes the decision-maker to be more skeptical about the signals that are reported. 
We then we prove in the appendix that: 
Proposition 7: (a) As λ  rises, the variance of the decision-maker’s posterior belief and 
the variance of the error associated with that beliefs when 1<λ . As λ  increases, the 
decision-maker believes that the variance of the error in his posterior beliefs also 
increases.  
 (b) If the decision-maker believes that the expectation of γπ /5.  is zero, but in the 
population this is not actually the case, then the expected error term in the posterior belief 
will be increasing with the mean of π  and with the covariance of π  and γ/1 . The 
expected error will increase with the mean of γ/1  if and only if the mean of π
 
is 
positive.  
 The proposition shows that increases in λ , which should be interpreted as increasing 
cynicism about the motives of persuaders, create less heterogeneity in posterior beliefs 
and more accurate beliefs. The first effect occurs because more cynicism means that the 
decision maker puts less weight on the signals that he hears and more weight on his 
unconditional prior of 0. The second effect occurs also because more cynicism means that 
the decision-maker puts less weight on signals,  
 As in the case of other errors that come from the Credulous Bayesianism, incorrect 
beliefs have the effect of making posteriors more erroneous but increasing the confidence 
with which people hold to those erroneous beliefs. In this case, naïve decision-makers 
think that they are far more accurate than cynical decision-makers whose beliefs hew 
more closely to reality.  
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 Part (b) of the proposition discusses the ex post bias of decision-maker beliefs given 
that the mean of γπ /5.  is not zero. In that case, increases in the mean value of π , the 
average incentive to persuade the decision-maker, will cause the bias to increase. 
Increases in the mean value of γ/1 , which captures the average willingness to lie, will 
cause the extent of the bias to increase if the mean of π  is positive or decrease if the 
mean of π  is negative. The willingness to lie tends to exacerbate the biases that come 
from an uneven distribution of incentives.  
 Finally, the covariance between the incentives to lie and the willingness to lie is also 
important. When these two things are more likely to go together, then the bias in 
posterior beliefs will increase. These results suggest that it isn’t the presence of incentives 
to lie that cause biased decisions. The problem comes when those incentives are unevenly 
distributed or correlated with the ability to lie.  
 So far we have assumed that the decision-maker has no idea about the biases that 
may afflict particular informants. Now we take the opposite assumption by assuming that 
the decision-maker has an assessment of iμ  for each individual equal to iiμλ  . We 
assume that the decision-maker believes that there is no error in his assessment of the 
bias. In this case, the decision-maker sets 
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one of the speakers. With these formulae, it follows that: 
Proposition 8: If λλ =i
 
for all i, then the variance of posterior beliefs and the variance 
of the error in posteriors beliefs decline with λ if λ is less than one. The decision maker’s 
perceived variance of the error in his posterior declines with λ for λ between 1/3 and 1 
and increases with λ for all other values. The expected level of bias is increasing in 
)/1,( iiCov γπ , ),1( iiCov μλ− , ( )iE π  and I. It is increasing with ( )iE γ/1  and decreasing 
with the average of iλ
 
if and only if ( )iE π
 
is positive. 
 The proposition first makes the point that if the same incorrect level of adjustment 
for incentives is applied to everyone, we should expect the variance of the posterior and 
the error around the posterior to fall as λ  rises. Both effects occur because higher values 
of λ  purge the statements of their biases and those biases create both excess variance and 
error.  
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 The expected level of bias in the posterior belief, and the decision, is a function of 
the mean level of ii μλ )1( − -- the uncorrected bias terms in the individual statements. 
This mean level will be increasing in the covariance between the extent that the decision-
maker fails to correct fully for bias and the degree of bias. If iλ
 
is constant across i, then 
this covariance term equals zero. If the decision-maker is more likely to be appropriately 
cynical towards only one side of the debate, then there will be biased decision-making.  
 Increases in the mean value of iπ  will increase the bias, because this implies that 
incentives are stacked more strongly on one side of the debate than on the other. If the 
mean value of iπ  is positive, then increasing the value of ( )iE γ/1 , which effectively 
means decreasing the cost of lying, will cause the level of bias to increase. As before, 
covariance, either positive or negative, between incentives and the ability to lie will 
increase the expected level of bias.  
 Increases in I will cause the bias to go up because as the number of people increases, 
the decision-maker puts more weight on the biased views of those people. This last result 
assumes that the overall mean level of bias is independent of I, which might not be true in 
practice. This result points again to the possibility that crowds might be more foolish than 
individuals.  
 We can also use this framework to make sense of an experiment designed to see how 
group polarization might be dampened (Abrams, 1990, 112). The experiment involved 
the creation of four-person groups. On the basis of pretesting, these groups were known 
to include equal numbers of persons on two sides of political issues—whether smoking 
should be banned in public places, whether sex discrimination is a thing of the past, 
whether censorship of material for adults infringes on human liberties, and so on. 
Judgments were registered on a scale running from +4 (strong agreement) to 0 (neutral) 
to –4 (strong disagreement). In half of the cases (the “uncategorized condition”), subjects 
were not made aware that the group consisted of equally divided subgroups in pretests. In 
the other half (the “categorized condition”), subjects were told that they would find a 
sharp division in their group, which consisted of equally divided subgroups. They were 
also informed who was in which group and told that they should sit around the table so 
that one subgroup was on one side facing the other group.  
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 In the uncategorized condition, discussion generally led to a dramatic reduction in 
the gap between the two sides, thus producing a convergence of opinion toward the 
middle of the two opposing positions (a mean of 3.40 scale points, on the scale of +4 to –
4). But things were very different in the categorized condition. Here the shift toward the 
median was much less pronounced, and frequently there was barely any shift at all (a 
mean of 1.68 scale points). In short, calling attention to group membership made people 
far less likely to shift in directions urged by people from different groups.  
 In our model, the distinction between categorized and uncategorized groups can be 
seen as comparing a scenario in which individuals know the value of γπ /5.  and a 
scenario in which they don’t. We will pare the experiment down to its essentials by 
assuming that there are exactly two people in each group, each of whom acts as both a 
decision-maker and a persuader. We also must assume that individuals have their own 
private signals. In both scenarios, one member of the dyad has a value of γπ /5.  equal to 
1 and the other has a value of -1. We also assume that the signal of the individual for 
whom γπ /5.  equals 1 is higher than the individual for whom γπ /5.  equals -1.   
 In the first scenario, both individuals believe that their partner is randomly drawn 
from the population both in their signal and in their value of γπ /5. . They also still 
believe that the population mean of is γπ /5.
 
zero. In the second scenario, the partners 
know the value of γπ /5.  for their partner. In both scenarios, people report signals equal 
to γβπ /5.~ += ii SS , where the value of β reflects the signal extraction formula used by 
the listened. Of course, the value of β differs between the two scenarios.  
 In the first scenario, when γπ /5.  is not known, and people are Credulous Bayesians, 
the value of β solves
( )
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βλβ
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. The difference between the two individuals opinions will equal 
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PPSS ji  . As *β  falls with λ, the gap between the two 
participants will rise as people become more cynical, so that more trust is associated with 
more homogeneity in the non-characterization treatment.  
 In the case where people know each other’s values of γπ /5. , then perfect Bayesians 
would correct completely for these incentives. Ex post everyone would know the right 
answer and they would agree on their opinions. Clearly, perfect Bayesian learning cannot 
explain the observed non-agreement in the categorization version of the experiment.  
 However, a particular form of Credulous Bayesianism can better match the facts. If 
individuals completely discounted information from people who are known to have 
opposing views and who are shading their statements accordingly, then this would ensure 
a complete failure to reach any sort of consensus. In this setting, Credulous Bayesianism 
would mean that we discretely categorize people into friends and enemies and completely 
ignore the statements of enemies.  
 This type of extreme categorization might enable us to make sense of the sharp 
differences in beliefs that we observe across groups. The preceding models stressed that 
these differences could reflect Credulous Bayesianism, which results in a tendency to 
take neighbors’ statements too seriously. However, in those models individuals were 
unaware of views held outside of the group. In the real world, people are often well aware 
that there are others who hold differing opinions. In either a standard Bayesian model or a 
model where people are Credulous Bayesians, those differing opinions should cause a 
substantial divergence across groups. In such a Bayesian model, American Christians 
should reduce their faith in God because Indians have a different belief system. 
Palestinians who believe that Mossad destroyed the World Trade Center should moderate 
their views because they know that Americans don’t share that view. If people thought 
that the views expressed by other groups were completely untrustworthy and shaped 
more by incentives to lie than by information, then we might be able to understand this 
failure of beliefs to converge. 
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VIII. Cognitive Diversity and Institutional Design 
 
  If people are acting as Bayesians, they will end up both more unified and more 
extreme as a result of group discussions. The result may be nothing to deplore. If group 
members begin with the thought that people likely have one heart and two kidneys, or 
that it is probably negligent to drive over 80 miles per hour in a crowded area near a 
school, there is no problem if discussion leads them to become more firmly committed to 
these beliefs and more unified in holding them. The same idea expresses the ideal 
conception of jury deliberation, as the exchange of information is supposed to ensure 
unanimity on a proposition that is true; and indeed juries typically polarize in criminal 
cases (Brown, 1986). The notion of deliberative democracy has similar foundations. If 
the initial distribution of information is adequate, there is nothing wrong with a situation 
in which participants in democratic deliberation become more extreme in their 
commitment to a certain outcome or course of action.   
 If, on the other hand, people are Credulous Bayesians, and overreacting to the actual 
or perceived views of others, they may end up making major mistakes. As we have seen, 
large groups may do worse, not better, than small ones. With respect to politics, people 
may accept some view that is clearly inconsistent with the facts; widespread 
commitments to implausible conspiracy theories, or to preposterous accounts of what 
“really” underlies some natural or social phenomenon, can be understood in this light. 
Actual behavior may be adversely affected as well—as, for example, when people falsely 
believe that they are at risk and take unjustified precautions, or falsely believe that they 
are safe and fail to take protective measures.  
 Of course it is not possible to move directly from an understanding of how social 
learning occurs to any particular set of institutional reforms. Much needs to be known 
about the particular context, including the particular form of Credulous Bayesianism. If 
people fail sufficiently to discount the self-interested incentives of speakers, as in the case 
of political advertising, the solution may be different from what it should be if people fail 
sufficiently to discount for the skewed nature of the distribution of information within 
their group. In some groups, people may be good Bayesians and engage in appropriate 
discounting. Perhaps expert institutions are able to do exactly that. In other groups, 
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diversity is desirable, but it also has significant costs in terms of (for example) increased 
acrimony, social loafing, and greater difficulty in reaching any decision at all. The 
benefits of error reduction may be lower than those costs.  
 With these disclaimers, we explore some possible implications here for independent 
regulatory agencies and federal appellate courts—two institutions that are extremely 
important and that are objects of considerable public debate. Our goal is not to make any 
particular normative recommendation, but to obtain a better understanding of current 
practices requiring diversity (in the case of administrative agencies) and current debates 
over the issue of diversity (in the case of federal appellate courts). We also offer a brief 
note on media policy. In particular, we are interested in the relationship between our 
claims and debates, past and present, over the “fairness doctrine” long imposed and now 
abandoned by the Federal Communications Commission. 
 
A. Independent Regulatory Commissions 
 
 A great deal of national policy is established by the so-called independent regulatory 
commissions, such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the National Labor Relations 
Board. These agencies typically consist of five members, who are appointed by the 
president (with the advice and consent of the Senate), serve for specified terms (usually 
seven years), and make decisions by majority vote. Because of the immense importance 
of their decisions, any Democratic president would much like to be able to ensure that the 
commissions consist entirely or almost entirely of Democratic appointees; Republican 
presidents would certainly like to shift policy in their preferred directions by ensuring 
domination by Republican appointees.  
 Under existing law, however, presidential control of the commissions is sharply 
constrained, for no more than a bare majority can be from a single political party. 
Congress has explicitly so required, and indeed this has become the standard pattern for 
the independent agencies. Hence, for example, the National Labor Relations Board and 
the Federal Communications Commission must consist either of three Republicans and 
two Democrats or of two Democrats and three Republicans. From the standpoint of the 
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president, a particular problem arises in a time of transition from one administration to 
the next. A Democratic president, for example, is often disturbed to learn that agencies 
entrusted with implementing legislation policy will be composed of at least two 
Republicans (appointed by his predecessor). 
 It should be clear that the requirement of bipartisan composition operates as a 
constraint on group polarization and extreme movements. Five Democratic appointees to 
the NLRB, for example, might well lead labor law in dramatic new directions. As we 
have seen, such movements could operate through rational Bayesianism. Perhaps a 
president would like to choose five people with extensive experience in labor-
management relations, specializing in marshalling evidence and arguments in support of 
labor unions. Perhaps the five Democratic appointees could learn from one another in a 
way that produces a consensus on some position that, while extreme in light of existing 
law, is sensible as a matter of policy. Or perhaps the movements could occur as a result 
of Credulous Bayesianism. NLRB commissioners might well discount the extent to 
which the information that they hold is shared by all, or the extent to which important 
views are missing, or the extent to which some of them are signaling a position that 
conforms to the perceived group norm. Such signaling can occur within expert groups as 
well as within groups of nonspecialists. If people are Credulous Bayesians, then the 
presence of two Republican appointees constrains the relevant movements and ensures 
that significant counterarguments will be offered. To this extent, bipartisan membership 
might serve to limit unwarrantedly extreme changes in regulatory policy.  
 We can now understand how requirements of bipartisan membership might 
reasonably be debated. In the abstract, it is not clear that any particular Congress would 
want to prevent relative extremism. A Democratic-majority Congress, and the groups 
who support its members, might well believe that an all-Democratic NLRB would have a 
better understanding of national labor policy; perhaps the rulings of such an NLRB would 
be a more faithful agent of that particular legislature. If Democratic members are perfect 
Bayesians, and if an all-Democratic NLRB contained the optimal range of information, 
so that Republican appointees would add confusion and falsehood, bipartisan 
composition would be hard to justify. (No legislator believes that the NLRB should have 
communist or anarchist members.) But if many members of Congress believe that 
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stability is desirable over time, and if most of them want to check unjustified movements 
produced by Credulous Bayesianism, legislators, and the diverse groups who pressure 
them, might be able to reach a consensus on bipartisan membership as the best means to 
their ends. Bipartisan membership might turn out to represent a stable kind of arms 
control agreement, in which members of both parties are willing to relinquish the 
possibility of extreme movements in their preferred direction in return for assurance 
against extreme movements the other way. And some legislators, and outside observers, 
might be willing to defend the current situation as reflecting an intuitive awareness of the 
consequences of Credulous Bayesianism. 
 
B. Federal Appellate Courts 
 
 Do similar considerations apply to the federal judiciary? At first glance, the judiciary 
is quite different, because many people believe that it is not supposed to make policy at 
all. But the evidence suggests a more complicated picture. Note first that judicial panels 
consist of three judges, and assignment to three-judge panels is random. This means that 
there are many DDD panels, many RRR panels, many RDD panels, and many RRD 
panels. As our analysis would predict, extreme movements are shown by DDD and RRR 
panels, in the sense that judges, on such panels, are especially likely to vote in line with 
ideological stereotypes.  
 We have referred to this point in general terms; now consider a few examples 
(Sunstein et al., 2006). On all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote for gay 
rights 14% of the time; on all-Democratic panels, Democratic appointees vote for gay 
rights 100% of the time. On all-Republican panels, Republican appointees vote to 
validate affirmative action programs 34% of the time; on all-Democratic panels, 
Democratic appointees vote to validate such programs 83% of the time. On all-
Republican panels, Republican appointees vote in favor of women in sex discrimination 
cases 30% of the time; on all-Democratic panels, Democratic appointees vote in favor of 
women in sex discrimination cases 76% of the time. On all-Republican panels, 
Republican appointees vote for disabled people in cases brought under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act 17% of the time; on all-Democratic panels, Democratic appointees 
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vote for disabled people in such cases 50% of the time. In cases brought under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, Republican appointees on all-Republican panels vote 
for environmental plaintiffs 20% of the time; in such cases, Democratic appointees on all-
Democratic panels vote for environmental plaintiffs 71% of the time. By contrast, both 
Republican and Democratic appointees show far more moderation when they sit on 
panels containing at least one appointee nominated by a president of the opposing 
political party. The difference between Republican and Democratic appointees is sharpest 
on DDD and RRR panels; sitting with like-minded judges appear to create significant 
polarization. The NLRB must have bipartisan membership, but appellate panels that 
review the NLRB need not; and the results of appellate review of NLRB decisions are 
very different depending on whether the panel is RRR or DDD (see Miles and Sunstein, 
forthcoming).  
 These patterns are consistent with perfect Bayesianism. On a DDD panel, 
Democratic appointees will hear different conclusions and different arguments from what 
they hear on a DRR panel. And if DDD panels contain all the arguments that it is useful 
to near, nothing is amiss. But it is at least possible that in some cases, such appointees are 
not receiving new information at all or that they should discount the relevant arguments 
by taking account of the sources. In short, Credulous Bayesianism may well be at work, 
even on the federal bench. Some of the time, we speculate, judges may well be acting as 
if agreement from other judges supplies additional information, when it does not. In 
support of our speculation, consider Judge Posner’s report that serious deliberation, and 
the careful exchange of information and reasons, are rare among three-judge panels (see 
Posner, forthcoming). If this is so, it is reasonable to believe that Credulous Bayesianism 
helps to account for the observed patterns. And at least some of the time, it is also 
reasonable to believe that in ideologically contested cases, the greater moderation of 
DDR or RDD panels is influenced by the existence of competing conclusions and even 
arguments. 
 The purpose of full or “en banc” review, on the courts of appeals, is to correct errors 
on the part of three-judge panels. If that is the purpose, and if we do not believe that Ds 
or Rs have a monopoly on information or wisdom, a relatively uncontroversial 
implication is that a warning flag should be raised whenever a unified panel goes far in 
40 
the ideologically predictable direction. That warning flag might justify closer 
consideration of en banc review. In the most important cases, the warning flag might also 
be relevant to the Supreme Court’s decision whether to take review, which is also 
designed to correct errors on the part of lower courts. It would seem quite sensible for the 
Supreme Court to consider, as a relevant factor, whether the decision it is being asked to 
review was decided by a unified or mixed panel. If a DDD panel has ruled in favor of an 
affirmative action program, or if an RRR panel has ruled against environmentalists 
challenging a federal regulation, there is particular reason to attend to an argument that 
the panel has erred. In fact we are willing to hypothesize that the Court’s reviewing 
practice is implicitly responsive to this consideration, and that the Court is distinctly 
likely to grant review in ideologically contested cases resolved by a DDD or RRR panel. 
It would be valuable to test this hypothesis empirically.  
 A possible counterargument would be that while the political party of the appointing 
president is a proxy for ideology, the proxy is crude: Some Republican appointees are 
more liberal, in general or in particular areas, that some Democratic appointees. A more 
fine-grained approach, attentive to the value of diversity, would inquire directly into the 
established voting tendencies of various judges, not into the political party of the 
appointing president. But it is not simple to operationalize the more fine-grained 
measures, even though they exist; and during judges’ early years on the bench, judicial 
records are too spare to permit easy characterizations. The political party of the 
appointing president may be the best way to combine (adequate) accuracy with ease of 
administration. 
 A much more controversial implication is that in the most difficult and ideologically 
charged cases, those who seek to avoid the effects of group polarization should consider 
efforts to create diverse judicial panels, as in the context of the NLRB and the FCC. (Of 
course any proposal in favor of balanced panels would be feasible only in circuits that 
have significant numbers of both Ds and Rs.) This implication is controversial because 
the judiciary is not understood as a policymaking institution, because such an approach 
might cement judicial self-identification in political terms, and because efforts to ensure 
ideological diversity might well be taken as inconsistent with the commitment to judicial 
neutrality. But the discussion here suggests that judges are policymakers of a distinctive 
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kind, and that in principle, the argument for diversity, as a means of counteracting 
Credulous Bayesianism and hence group polarization, is not significantly different from 
the argument in the context of the independent regulatory commissions. Recall here that 
while the NLRB must be DDDRR or RRRDD, reviewing courts are not similarly 
constrained, and that the ultimate fate of NLRB decisions and hence national labor law, 
even in the most important domains, will often be radically different if the reviewing 
court is RRR or DDD. By contrast, appellate panels are far more moderate if they are 
RRD or RDD.  
 
C. Media Policy and Diversity 
 
 For many years, the Federal Communications imposed the “fairness doctrine,” 
which, in brief summary, required radio and television broadcasters to cover issues of 
public controversy and to allow presentations by competing sides (Sunstein, 1993). 
Under the fairness doctrine, it would be unacceptable for a television station to offer the 
“liberal” position on all issues, without permitting alternative positions to have their say. 
The fairness doctrine was of course highly controversial, in part because of evident 
difficulties in administration, and indeed it was challenged in the Supreme Court on the 
ground that it abridged the free speech rights of broadcasters (Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, 1969). In the view of the challengers, the government should not be allowed to 
force them to present certain positions on the stations that they owned. 
 For our purposes, the Court’s response was of special interest. The Court emphasized 
that the “rights of listeners and viewers,” rather than the rights of broadcasters, should be 
taken as paramount. In the Court’s views, listeners and viewers had something like a 
“right” to be exposed to competing positions, and a single set of presentations, from a 
single point of view, would violate that “right.” This claim might seem puzzling in the 
abstract; whether or not is it correct, it is far easier to understand the Court’s concern in 
light of the arguments we have offered. Credulous Bayesians might fail to discount the 
partiality or bias of a station that offers a particular point of view; they might treat the 
presentation that is offered as relevantly representative even though it is not. Without the 
fairness doctrine, there is a risk that people will live in echo chambers, or information 
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cocoons, in which they end up more confident and more extreme simply because they are 
listening to the same point of view.  
 We do not mean to hear to explore the greatly contested question whether the 
fairness doctrine was a good idea, even in its time of great scarcity of broadcasters; the 
point is only that the doctrine, and the Court’s decision to uphold it, may well be 
understood as reflecting an intuitive understanding of Credulous Bayesianism. Ordinary 
listeners and viewers, hearing a station that repeatedly offers a single perspective, might 
not sufficiently discount the points of view that they are hearing.   
 In the modern era, the FCC has mostly repealed the doctrine’s requirements, largely 
on the theory that with so many options and outlets, people are able to have access to an 
exceedingly wide range of information and opinions. Nothing said here demonstrates that 
this conclusion was wrong. But the remaining problem, signaled by our analysis, is that if 
people are engaged in a degree of self-sorting, so that they select points of view with 
which they antecedently agree, they might well be moved in the direction of extremism 
precisely because of the operation of Credulous Bayesianism.  
 To the extent that there is a high degree of self-sorting, the communications market 
may reveal a fully voluntary version of the Colorado experiment. The market is likely to 
have some similar dynamics, underpinned by Credulous Bayesianism, producing both 
polarization and confidence. In fact we would predict that a fully open communications 
market, with ideologically identifiable sources and with voluntary sorting, would, for 
many people, replicate the results of that experiment. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 We have argued here that extreme movements can be a product of rational updating, 
as people respond to the information and the arguments offered by others. To this extent, 
polarized opinions need not reflect any kind of bias or irrationality on the part of those 
whose opinions have been rendered more extreme. To the extent that people are 
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responding rationally to new information, more confident and more extreme groups may 
well be wise. 
 At the same time, polarization may often be produced by Credulous Bayesianism, in 
which people treat the views of others as significantly more informative than they 
actually are. We have offered and explored four possibilities. (1) Sometimes people’s 
opinions have common sources, and hence the views of others add little. (2) Sometimes 
group members are not a random sample of the population as a whole and the 
predeliberation distribution of views is biased. (3) Sometimes group members frame their 
views so as to curry favor or to avoid social sanctions. (4) Sometimes people have 
incentives to mislead. We have suggested that Credulous Bayesians give insufficient 
weight to these possibilities, in a way that can produce significant blunders. Errors by 
deliberating groups are frequently a product of these four phenomena. As a result of these 
errors, members of deliberating groups may well be less wise as well as more extreme 
than individuals. 
 An understanding of Credulous Bayesianism does not lead to any simple prescription 
for institutional design, but it does have important implications, and it helps explain a 
number of current practices and debates. Congress’ decision to require bipartisan 
composition on the independent regulatory commissions, and the absence of a significant 
controversy over that decision, might be explained as responsive to an understanding of 
the risks associated with the possible movements that we have explored here. Much more 
controversially, we have suggested that an understanding of group polarization and 
Credulous Bayesianism helps to explain current calls for diversity on federal appellate 
panels. The question of appropriate media policy raises many complexities that we have 
44 
not explored, but it is plain that many past and current controversies are rooted on an 
intuitive awareness of the phenomenon of group polarization and the possibility that 
Credulous Bayesianism might lead both individuals and groups in unfortunate directions. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 
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The derivative of the variance of ex post beliefs with respect to I is 
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Proof of Proposition 5: 
 
(a) 
 
The variance of the error around the posterior when people are perfect Bayesians is 
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When individuals do not think that there is any common noise (i.e., they are naïve 
Bayesians) then the variance is
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The basic formula for the posterior can be written 
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And if this condition holds, then by continuity there must be some α sufficiently close to 
zero such this derivative is still negative. 
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(b) 
The reduction in error variance moving from 0=α  to 5.=α  for the perfect Bayesian 
equals  
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This condition can be rewritten:  
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So the naïve Bayesian always becomes more accurate.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6: The formula for the posterior can be written:  
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And the difference between the posterior and the true value of the outcome, D, equals 
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Which is increasing with λ . 
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Proof of Corollary 1: The results in this corollary follow directly from applying 
Proposition 4 and that fact that γλ /1= .  
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Proof of Proposition 7: 
The posterior belief of the decision-maker equals 
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 The expected error term in the posterior equals μβ I2*  , and the value of μ  can be 
written as .5 times ( ) ( )( )γπγπ /1/1, +Cov  where ( )γπ /1,Cov  is the ex post covariance of 
π  and γ/1  and ( )π  and ( )γ/1  are the ex post means of π  and γ/1  respectively. The ex 
post bias is clearly increasing with ( )γπ /1,Cov  and ( )π , and with ( )γ/1  when ( ) 0>π .  
.  
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Proof of Proposition 8: The posterior belief of the decision-maker equals 
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This is increasing in )/1,( iiCov γπ , ),1( iiCov μλ− , and ( )iE π  and increasing with 
( )iE γ/1  and ( )iE λ−1  if and only if ( )iE π  is positive.  
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